In drawing up this proposal, the recommended cooperation model would be beneficial to public and private institutions. It would also force hacked corporations to institutionalize communication mechanisms to law enforcement agencies and their clients. Cross vectors between population (in general), municipalities, police and corporations, whether listed or not.
This complexity reflects the diversity of threats and vulnerable objectives. We are aware that the implementation of this recommendation is contrary to many stakeholders, including corporations (no wonder) and the (surprising) enforcement of the law. In any case, this cooperation was taken up with scepticism as a model of collective security, combined with a component of self-defence (in both cases derived from international law).
Corporate resistance reflected, as competitive advantages, concerns about possible loss of income and other unwanted effects. On the other hand, law enforcement emerged from two logics: the unwillingness of federal police to collaborate with local agents and the lack of means to deal with cyberattacks.
How to get a corporate model? There are several alternatives and alternatives, which in some cases replace voluntary measures and in others replace those resulting from legal taxation.This certainly imposes unwanted and sometimes unjustified costs. However, the risks and threats arising from cyber attacks justify the search for mechanisms to enforce cooperation. In other words, if voluntary cooperation is not possible, the debate should be open to the possibility of cooperation being compulsory.